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ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
Reforms of natural monopolies need clear 
delineations between the industries where 
market mechanisms contribute to social 
welfare and those where the costs of a tran-
sition to a market economy outweigh the be-
nefits. In this article, we emphasise the dif-
ficulty of finding the optimum modes of go-
vernance within industries as a whole. 
Using the tools of the transaction cost eco-
nomics, we show that, alongside the prob-
lem of market boundaries and the resultant 
position and behaviour of a company — an 
object of antimonopoly regulation — it is 
necessary to consider the hypothesis about 
the market being a special mechanism for 
coordinating interactions between economic 
entities. In particular, such determinants of 
transactions as asset specificity, uncertain-
ty, and frequency can create a basis for aban-
doning the price mechanism. Williamson’s 
heuristic models suggest that if an activity is 
characterized by high specificity, uncertain-
ty, and frequency, the very organisation of 
this activity precludes transaction cost mini-
misation through the price mechanism em-
ployed either in full or in part (hybrid insti-
tutional agreements). This can be explained 
by excessive risks and ensuing high transac-
tion costs. A more efficient solution is the 
organisation of interactions within a group 
of legal entities in control (within a single 
economic entity).  
In order to compare the practical imple-
mentation of institutional alternatives, we 
examine the modes of governance in the gas 
supply industry. A major focus is the Baltic re-
gion where two interconnected pipelines — 
the Nord Stream and the OPAL — were 
constructed. Different ways to handle trans-
actions relating to gas supply were emp-
loyed at the time. We compare these ways 
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and conclude that it is necessary to consider the determinants of a transaction to 
select the best structural alternative and to avoid choosing a wrong governance 
structure. 
 
Keywords: market, transaction, modes of governance, hierarchy, gas, pi-
pelines 
 
Introduction 
 
At the interface of academic, political, economic, and legal discourse, 
it is easy to confuse different meanings embedded in the same essential 
word. This word is market. A transition from a functional to an 
instrumental definition of market, and vice versa, may not only change 
ideas about current economic practices but also lead to regulatory 
conclusions, affecting decision-making in business and law enforcement. 
We remind the reader that, in economic studies, the functional differs 
from the instrumental in that the latter does not require a research 
approach to depend on the spatial and temporal context. In particular, 
instrumental rationality suggests that decisions made by individuals be 
examined in terms of maximisation behaviour, regardless of whether 
maximisation takes place in reality. The focus is on the explanatory, or 
predictive, power of this approach. The instrumental approach to 
analysing relations between economic agents can be described in terms of 
contracts. This is possible even if the counterparties did not mean to 
discuss terms and conditions or, least of all, conclude any agreements. 
Implicit contracts are a vivid example of such a situation. Accordingly, 
the instrumental approach to market research may appear as the 
presentation of almost any interaction between economic agents as a 
market one and the identification of relevant prices and quantities. In its 
turn, functionalism in the approach to behaviour studies in terms of 
rationality and to interactions in terms of contracts and market requires a 
weakening of the premise about the de facto absence of structural 
alternatives to economic exchange organisation (further, modes of 
governance). Another requirement of a positive analysis is the weakening 
of the premise about the absence of legally binding characteristics of 
contracts, or at least those perceived as such by its counterparties. The 
functional approach to studying the market as a means of organising inte-
ractions among economic agents allows for not only a comparative ana-
lysis but also for establishing the absence of a market despite the presen-
ce of such external attributes as relevant operations, transactions, and 
connections among legal entities. 
This work aims to identify the grounds and possible consequences of 
a conclusion about the absence of market as a vehicle for interactions 
between parties to individual transactions, even if these transactions 
comprise operations relating to the production and transfer of goods. This 
also holds true for transfers between legal entities. 
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In section one, we will consider the problem definition as presented 
in research literature. In section two, we will give a theoretical interpre-
tation that will provide an explanation necessary to delineate the boun-
daries of antitrust enforcement. In section three, we will examine major 
disputes among corporations and/or public authorities. In such situations, 
the question of a correct interpretation of relations between the counter-
parties, or, in other words, whether such relations can be interpreted as 
market ones, was coming to the fore. Finally, we draw conclusions about 
the appropriateness of interventions into economic agents’ relations from 
competition authorities, depending on the employed mode of governance. 
This problem is not limited to local cases of ‘degradation’. On the 
contrary, it has a wide scope, primarily, when it comes to relations in the 
province of natural monopolies amid ongoing reforms and the incomple-
teness of the regulatory framework. 
 
1. Problem definition 
 
Reforms in the system of natural monopolies require clear delinea-
tions between the areas where market mechanisms contribute to public 
welfare and those where the costs of a transition to a market economy 
outweigh the benefits. The need to identify what mode of governance is 
the most efficient one from the perspective of economics complicates de-
cision-making. Note that the mechanism should be efficient not for the 
industry as a whole, or the circulation of certain goods or services, but for 
a special combination of transactions under certain spatial and temporal 
circumstances. Moreover, the conditions for such transactions may sig-
nificantly differ [1, p. 45, 105]. 
The difficulty of choosing an optimal mechanism for transaction 
management for an industry as a whole is manifested in the existence of 
mixed regimes. For instance, Russia’s electric power industry retains so-
called non-price areas where ‘market relations are still impossible for 
technological reasons’ [2]. The market mechanism for transaction 
management — the price mechanism — is replaced in this situation by a 
trilateral governance mechanism described by O. Williamson [3, p. 79], 
the third party being a public regulator. The public regulator resolves the 
most serious disputes (firstly, those relating to rates) and sets the 
framework for relations within the industry. In the market of petroleum 
products transportation, pipeline tariffs are also regulated by the state. 
However, in October 2016, Russia’s Federal Anti-Monopoly Service 
(FAS) carried out a market analysis and recommended to terminate such 
regulation to further the transformation of natural monopolies towards 
market competition [4]. At the same time, it was proposed that Transneft 
remained on the natural monopoly register and that the Federal Antimo-
A. E. Shastitko, A. A. Kurdin 
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nopoly Service retained control over the performance of the company. 
Transneft is considered a dominant economic agent in the market in 
question, regardless of its market share. A possible solution is a transition 
from a trilateral mechanism for transaction management to the market 
(price) mechanism. This will be possible if the decision of the FAS is 
adopted and the Service refrains from interventions in the pricing 
process. 
The gas extraction, transportation, and distribution industries, which 
are the focus of this article, are in urgent need of selecting an optimal 
mode of governance. This holds true for both Russia and other countries, 
for instance, the EU member states. 
From the perspective of the regulatory component of the business 
environment, antitrust regulation is one of the most sensitive aspects of 
the functioning of large companies in Russia, including national natural 
monopolists. In analysing the cases of a possible abuse of a dominant 
position by a company that is not a natural monopolist, a specific set of 
issues come to the fore. Using economic analysis tools, these issues may 
be interpreted as a company’s lines of defence. Overall, they may be 
divided into three groups: (1) the delineation of the product and geogra-
phical boundaries of an economic agent’s market; (2) the identification of 
an economic agent’s position in the market (whether it dominates the 
market, if so, individually or collectively); and (3) an assessment of the 
actions of an economic agent from the perspective of possible conse-
quences (whether, and if so how, it abuses its dominant position), in-
cluding those for the consumer. 
At first glance, these issues pose a dilemma for a natural monopolist. 
It may be established in a dispute that a company operates in a natural 
monopoly market. In this case, the company’s position is classified by 
default as dominant, according to Paragraph 5 of Article 5 of the Russian 
Law On Competition Protection. Only issue (3) remains relevant for such 
a monopolist. In effect, this means the launch of a trilateral mode of 
governance with government’s mediation. The antitrust policy is tailored 
to deal with such situations. 
Otherwise, it may be established that a company does not operate in a 
natural monopoly market. In this case, the antitrust authorities should 
deal with it as they do with any other company. The antitrust authorities 
have to use standard procedures, i. e. to control the effective performance 
of the market mode of governance. Another special case is that of a 
bilateral monopoly when the companies on both sides of the market are 
not natural monopolies and there are no other grounds for a regulatory 
authority’s intervention. In this situation, it is highly probable that a 
bilateral mechanism for transaction management will be applied if the 
regulatory authority refrains from any intervention. This situation is 
examined in in more detail in [5]. 
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However, in all these cases, autonomous parties to a transaction 
transfer rights to each other. Therefore, from the perspective of the 
antitrust policy, there are grounds to speak of a commodity market, even 
if the relevant relations do not always fall within the market mode of 
governance. 
At the same time, such a model overlooks another possibility for a 
scrupulous company to protect its legitimate interests. This is to question 
the synonymy of the two concepts that may seem quite similar — 
operations relating to the production and transfer of a product between 
two legal entities, on the one hand, and the sale of commodities, on the 
other. 
This requires a hierarchical mode of governance, which may be more 
efficient than those considered above. However, an instance of vertical 
integration, it does not entail autonomy of its parts. This rules out any 
interpretation of relations between the parties to a transaction in market 
terms and thus takes such cases beyond the permissible set of situations 
that necessitate the use of antitrust policy tools. 
In other words, it comes down to the foundations of the existence of a 
market as a special mechanism for organising interactions among 
participants in an economic activity, or economic agents, in terms of the 
antitrust legislation. This problem cannot be easily solved applying 
current regulations and usual economic analysis tools described in 
microeconomics textbooks. It seems that any interaction can be 
interpreted as a market one, even in the absence of the major market 
element — price. We remind the reader that the presence of price per se 
does not necessarily mean the presence of a market. A vivid example is 
transfer pricing. 
However, the transaction cost economics, a key element of which is a 
comparative analysis of discrete structural alternatives to transaction 
organisation, opens up new opportunities. These opportunities pertain to 
using an economic analysis of non-standard situations for the purposes of 
antitrust enforcement and to improving type I and type II error rates in 
law enforcement [6; 7], in view of the available alternatives [8], including 
those relating to competition protection [9]. Thus, the next section will 
present the tools of the transaction cost economics adapted to fit this study. 
 
2. Theory 
 
Meeting the standards of economic analysis is a major requirement 
for improving the quality of law enforcement in regard to competition 
protection in commodity markets. This makes it possible to interpret both 
the results of an economic analysis and the situations of antitrust enforce-
A. E. Shastitko, A. A. Kurdin 
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ment [10]. To a great degree, this is a result of the valuative nature of the 
major rules of competition, the application of which requires that facts be 
established using relevant concepts borrowed from different areas of 
economics. One of the most promising areas in this context is the transac-
tion cost theory. 
The transaction cost economics, which is not to be confused with new 
institutional economics (for more detail, see [11]), highlights a number of 
important circumstances of running operations, namely, transaction attri-
butes. They should be taken into account for the operations and relevant 
investment, as well as benefits for society, to be not only effective but 
also possible. These attributes are asset specificity, uncertainty, and fre-
quency. Before discussing these attributes in detail, we should emphasise 
that transaction cost economics employs two behavioural premises — 
bounded rationality and opportunism [1]. What comes to the fore is that 
the results of using institutions of economic relations organisation depend 
on both the structure of incentives for agents and agents’ ability to adapt, 
individually or collectively, to changing circumstances. 
1. Asset specificity. Producing profits for their owners, assets can be 
used in very different ways, depending on the terms and conditions of 
contracts concluded with various counterparties. If redeployment to 
alternative uses or by alternative users or the repudiation of a contract by 
any counterparty does not lead to significant changes in productive value, 
there are reasons to believe that this asset is not specific. Strictly spea-
king, this thesis corresponds to the fundamental principle that competi-
tive equilibrium translates into zero economic profit. 
However, if there is a stable and noticeable difference between profits 
from one of the available ways to use an asset and the next profitable 
alternative, there are grounds to consider such an asset specific. The 
difference between profits from a contract with a certain counterparty and 
the greatest profit from a contract with an alternative counterparty is 
called quasi-rent, which is the measure of an asset’s specificity.1 In line 
with Williamson’s ideas [1], the economic theory used to distinguish four 
types of specific assets. Later, the classification was expanded to include 
six types: (1) site specificity; (2) physical specificity; (3) the size of the 
market (dedicated assets); (4) human specificity (knowledge necessary 
for the transaction); (5) brand-name specificity; (6) temporal specificity 
[12, p. 3]. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to take into 
account the attributes that fall under the categories of temporal or site 
specificity. 
                                                     
1 Note that quasi-rent does not attest to the market power of counterparties. On 
the contrary, it testifies to the vulnerability of the profits of both parties, if the 
contractual relations do not include protection from the parties’ opportunism 
under uncertainty (this will be addressed below). The latter may be a result of 
the absence of contractual precautions.  
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The more specific an asset, all other things being equal, the less 
effective the use of the price mechanism for the company is and, thus, 
there are fewer grounds to consider the object of a transaction ‘a 
commodity’ and the area of interactions between the parties ‘a commo-
dity market’. 
This thesis is illustrated by the well-known heuristic model [1], which 
reflects conditions for minimising transaction costs at different levels of 
asset specificity. According to this approach, zero asset specificity, which 
is characteristic of the use of non-specific assets, translates into positive 
transaction costs. However, such an undedicated mechanism for transac-
tion mechanism as pricing ensures minimum transaction costs, whereas 
maximum costs are associated with the hierarchy (see figure 1). As asset 
specificity increases, transaction costs grow for all the three basic 
institutional arrangements — markets, hybrids, and hierarchies. This sta-
tement is of crucial importance for the discussion below. High rates of 
increase in transaction costs are associated with low levels of transaction 
costs when non-specific assets are used. Thus, there are two points of 
redeployment, which necessitate a transition from the price mechanism 
through a hybrid institutional arrangement to a hierarchy as a key 
characteristic of relations within an economic firm, as asset specificity 
increases. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Conditions for the minimising transaction costs  
as asset specificity changes 
k is asset specificity, G is the level of transaction costs, f(k...) is the function  
of transactions costs for the price mechanism, ( ...)k  is the function of transaction costs  
for the hybrid mechanism; φ(k...) is the function of transaction costs for the hierarchy  
mechanism, k1 and k2 are the levels of asset specificity for a transition from the price  
to the hybrid mechanism and from the hybrid to hierarchy mechanisms  
(transaction levels G1 and G2 correspond to these transitions) 
A. E. Shastitko, A. A. Kurdin 
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High asset specificity does not make the use of the price mechanism 
impossible. However, this mechanism becomes economically impractical 
because it violates the basic principles of selective association of transac-
tions with relevant governance structures in solving the problems of 
transaction cost minimisation. 
Williamson’s original model does not cover possible situations when, 
until a certain level of asset specificity, the actual level of transaction 
costs is above the potential one for each structural alternative. However, 
in figure 1, this gap is closed. Moreover, a certain implicit limitation has 
to be weakened for the sake of a consistent comparative analysis of 
discrete structural alternatives to transaction organisation [13, p. 108; 14, 
p. 210]. In the cases of (1) the violation of the principles of institutional 
design at a microlevel (contracts) or of (2) ‘market fundamentalism’ (see 
[7]), higher transaction costs of utilising the price or hybrid mechanism 
will not pose an obstacle to the application (or, at least, attempts at the 
application) of market modes of governance, despite economic ineffi-
ciency. 
2. Uncertainty. Entrepreneurship is associated with uncertainty. Of 
crucial importance is how uncertainty is understood and how it can be 
taken into account in selecting a form of economic organisation (a mode 
of governance). This has been stressed in a number of studies [1; 15, 
P. 14—15]. The three major ways to organise operations and, therefore, 
interactions between economic agents — using prices, hierarchical 
relations, and a hybrid institutional arrangement — suggest different 
mechanisms for the adaptation of counterparties to changes in the 
economic situation. Each of the three alternatives has its own com-
parative advantages associated with different levels of asset specificity 
and uncertainty. 
In the case of higher asset specificity, the higher the uncertainty of 
business decision making, the greater the incentives for using hierarchical 
instruments for transaction management and the fewer grounds to 
consider the asset in question a commodity and the relevant relations a 
commodity market. The only exception is the situation when the applica-
tion of classical contracts and the price mechanism are invariants for non-
specific assets by transaction frequency. 
The price mechanism is efficient when it allows market participants 
to adapt to unexpected changes in the operation conditions independently 
of each other and without lengthy and complicated negotiations. Such 
changes can be caused by alterations in commodity circulation in a 
market under the effect of external factors or by the unscrupulous 
behaviour of a counterparty. In the case of the hierarchy mechanism 
(within an economic agent with a single control centre), rapid adaptation 
is also possible. However, this does not apply to hybrid forms. Why is it 
so? Alongside independent decision-making by the parties, the price 
mechanism is associated with the minimum dependence of market 
players on a certain counterparty. If a need arises to switch between 
contracting agents, the costs will be at the minimum. Although permitting 
 Economics 
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independent decision-making by the parties, any hybrid form requires 
that adaptation to changing conditions is collective and that switching to 
a different counterparty does not take place. This is not always possible. 
The higher the uncertainty, the greater the significance of the ways to 
adapt to unexpected changes (including such a crucial dimension of 
entrepreneurship as time). Why should one use hybrid forms and sign 
long-term package contracts with prolongation mechanisms when one 
can use the price mechanism? The latter solution would not cause any 
problems but there is a catch, namely, the dependence of one of the 
parties on preserving relations with the other one due to asset specificity. 
Such a unilateral dependence is associated with significant risks of the 
expropriation of quasi-rent, i. e. profits associated with the operations of a 
specific asset owner. However, until such operations commence (a pro-
ject is launched), there are none (or very weak) incentives to invest in 
specific assets. In other words, the expropriation of quasi-rent inevitably 
weakens the incentive to invest in such assets. Accordingly, the absence 
of contractual precautions becomes a source of a relative reduction in 
public welfare because of missing the opportunities for using specific 
resources where they will be more productive than non-specific ones. 
Figure 2 illustrates this thesis. Its original is found in [1] and more de-
tailed versions in [13, p. 106; 14 p. 208] 
 
 
Fig. 2. The selection of governance structures on the degree  
of uncertainty and asset specificity 
U is the uncertainty level, k is asset specificity; AB is the demarcation line between  
the market and the hierarchy under high uncertainty; k1B is the demarcation line between  
the market and the hybrid under low uncertainty and low asset specificity; Bk2  
is the demarcation line between the hierarchy and the hybrid in the case of asymmetry  
in the design of the two types of institutional arrangements; Bk3 is the demarcation line 
between the hierarchy and the hybrid in the case of symmetry in the design  
of the two types of institutional arrangements 
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That is why an increase in uncertainty and asset specificity translates 
into the forcing out of hybrid mechanisms and a wider application of the 
price and the hierarchy mechanisms. This is explained by that the 
transaction costs of renegotiation, which becomes more probable under 
high uncertainty, grow at the highest rate when hybrid forms are emp-
loyed. In terms of the antitrust law, this would mean organising opera-
tions within one economic agent or one group of agents governed mana-
ged from a single control centre. 
However, just as in the above example, it is important to consider 
what consequence the wrong choice of a mode of governance will entail, 
when the hierarchical principle of transaction organisation is rejected as 
inadmissible in favour of the hybrid mode of governance. The latter 
mechanism creates grounds for the enforcement of antitrust laws — in 
this case, it is possible to answer the questions about the price and the 
commodity that is the object of contractual relations. 
3. The frequency of transactions in regard to the production, transfer, 
and processing of products with the same counterparty. This factor would 
not mean much on its own without the other two — asset specificity and 
uncertainty. Moreover, some studies show that the role of transaction 
frequency has not been sufficiently explicated [16]. Below, we will 
analyse transaction frequency in view of this consideration. 
Frequency can refer to several aspects: (1) the frequency of 
interactions with a certain set of participants (up and down the production 
chain, not necessarily buyers and sellers); (2) long-term relations (all 
other things equal, the higher the frequency, the more long-term the 
relations). In particular, the latter aspect is crucial to complex, capital-
intensive projects with a long payback period. In both cases, voluntary 
contractual relations between independent parties are complicated by an 
inability to foresee how specific assets will be used and the output will be 
distributed between the parties. 
The higher the frequency of contractual relations with the same 
counterparty, the fewer incentives there are to use the market mode of 
governance and the fewer grounds there are to consider an asset as a 
commodity and the relevant relation as a commodity market. 
In summing up the above overview of transaction cost economics, it 
is necessary to consider the following. The very organisation of opera-
tions associated with high asset specificity, high uncertainty of the econo-
mic situation, and high frequency prevents from minimising transaction 
costs by using the price mechanism in whole or in part (by means of 
hybrid institutional arrangements). This is explained by excessive risks 
and resulting transaction costs that will be higher than those borne in the 
case of relations within a group of entities with a control centre (within 
one economic agent). 
 Economics 
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Hierarchy as a mode of governance simplifies collective adaptation to 
changing conditions, since residuary rights — included in Honoré’s 
eleven incidents of ownership [17] — are an important indication of to 
whom a certain resource or asset belongs [18]. This incident of 
ownership is invoked when incomplete contracts, part of which cannot be 
turned into complete ones even ex-post [19], ex-ante do not contain an 
answer to the question what actions the parties should take under limited 
time for adaptation to changing conditions (time specificity). 
 
3. Gas pipelines: An analysis 
 
Natural gas can be transported along pipelines using different modes 
of governance, including both general and dedicated ones.2 The core of 
the first category is the price mechanism. However, the specifics of gas 
pipeline transportation make the use of this mechanism without 
alterations from the state a rare occasion, even if the pipeline was 
constructed to accommodate for multiple gas suppliers and consumers. 
This section considers two situations, one of which helps to introduce the 
historical context of the development of gas transportation and distribu-
tion system. The other situation describes emerging approaches to the se-
lection of a mechanism for transaction management, where the pipeline is 
an extremely specific asset, which is used in transactions associated with 
high frequency and rather high uncertainty. 
 
3.1. International practices of regulating access to the system  
of gas transportation and distribution: The economic impracticability  
of market transactions 
 
In different countries, there are different conditions for the use of 
pipelines. In this short overview, we will show that the use of gas pipe-
line, based on the hybrid modes of governance, yields better results and 
has wider currency when the sections included in the pipeline systems are 
less specific. However, in the most developed systems that grant 
independent participants access to gas pipelines, namely, the US and the 
UK, the legislative systems allows for the impossibility to use market 
mechanisms in its pure form, which is reflected in complex regulatory 
requirements. 
                                                     
2 A general mechanism suggests that, for any contracting party different to the 
owner, conditions for using an asset are universal. A case of a general mecha-
nism is the use of terms and conditions stipulated within government regulation. 
A dedicated mechanism suggests that the conditions for the use of an asset are 
negotiated individually with each contracting party.  
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In the US, the complicated history of gas market regulation spans 
80 years. In 1938, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) — later, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) — was given jurisdic-
tion over interstate natural gas pipelines and wholesale sales so that 
pipeline owners did not abuse the market power. Against the background 
of the vertical integration of extraction and transportation companies or 
collusions between such companies, the abuse of power could manifest 
itself in setting inflated prices at the wellhead. From the mid-1950s, FPC 
was intervening in the organisation of related transactions and regulating 
wholesale gas prices. However, that initiative was not a success. 
Regulating prices for each deposit was too expensive and the prices were 
unprofitable for producers. As a result, the US was faced with a gas 
shortage. During the reforms of 1989—1993, wholesale price regulation 
was abolished [20]. At the same time, the regulation of gas pipeline 
services continued, although it was modified by Order No. 636.3 The 
document compelled all the owners of interstate gas pipelines to restruc-
ture their operations through unbundling their non-regulated sales servi-
ces from regulated transportation services. Thus, after November 1993, 
pipeline companies could only ship gas to end-users. All interstate 
pipelines are regulated by FERC.4 FERC oversees the operations of gas 
transportation companies, in particular, it sets tariffs (if certain flexibility 
mechanisms are available, at the discretion of regulated entities) for the 
services provided, lays down access conditions and considers applica-
tions for the expansion of the existing capacities or the construction of 
new ones. Thus, even several decades after the launch of the reform 
aimed at unbundling gas transportation as a natural monopoly activity 
and production and sales as competitive activities, there is still a need for 
regulation to compensate for the faults of the market mechanism. 
An interesting case is the Australian gas transportation system. There 
are significant differences between the market carriage system in Victoria 
and the contract carriage system in the other states. In the first case, 
pipeline owners grant the Australian Energy Market Operator access to 
the capacities. The Operator is responsible for transmission. Just as in the 
systems of regulated access to gas transmission capacities, a representati-
ve of the state is expected to ensure the absence of (or at least an effective 
limitation to) opportunism in contracts between market participants. In 
the second case, beyond the state of Victoria, gas suppliers conclude 
bilateral agreements with gas pipeline operators. Such agreements specify 
the maximum daily quantity of gas. The decision about introducing, or 
                                                     
3 Order No. 636 — Restructuring of Pipeline Services http://www.ferc.gov/legal/ 
maj-ord-reg/land-docs/restruct.asp, accessed 13.02.18. 
4 U. S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_ 
gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/fullversion.pdf, accessed 13.02.18. 
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refraining from the regulation of a certain gas pipeline is made by the 
National Competition Council based on the assessment of the compe-
tition level. Within full regulation, both price and non-price conditions of 
pipeline access should be in line with the Access Arrangement Guideline. 
They require approval from the regulatory authority. Light regulation 
means that the operator can set tariffs independently, publishing them on 
its website. A gas pipeline can be recognised as uncovered if it has a 
limited market power [21]. For such gas pipelines, the access of a third 
party is coordinated within gas transportation agreements (GTAs). Howe-
ver, this is almost the only case when the terms and conditions of a cont-
ract covering the use of gas transportation capacities are not regulated by 
the state. Moreover, this happens against the background of specificity 
plummeting due to the opportunity to choose counterparties — both pipe-
line owners and consumers. 
In the UK, gas industry operations were carried out within a single 
vertically integrated structure — British Gas — until the 1980s. The re-
form opened access to pipelines for third parties. British Gas was pri-
vatised, although vertical integration was left intact. However, the reform 
was not completed at the time. De facto, the access of outside companies 
to the pipeline network was not granted on acceptable conditions. The 
market of transportation services had not been functional until unbun-
dling. Today, National Grid Gas is the owner and operator of the national 
transmission system (NTS). It supplies gas to distribution networks or 
directly to power stations and large business users.5 The function of 
National Grid Gas is to maintain the supply/demand ratio through trade 
on the On-the-Day Commodity Market. The industry is regulated by the 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), the principal function 
of which is to support competition and regulate the operations of mono-
polies within these industries. In particular, since April 2013, the 
OFGEM has exercised the RIIO-T1 price control over National Grid 
Gas.6 Alongside the national operator, which is responsible for transporting 
gas through major gas pipelines, there are independent companies in the gas 
carriage market that are engaged in distribution (GTC Pipelines, 
Independent pipelines, ES Pipelines, Energetics, Fulcrum Pipelines, Indigo 
Pipelines Limited7), whose rates are also regulated by the OFGEM. 
The EU policy for gas transmission regulation has been developing 
over the past 25—30 years. Overall, it is based on the principles under-
                                                     
5 https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/about-grid/our-role-industry/about-gas, acces-
sed 13.02.18. 
6 https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/gas/transmission-networks/network-price-controls, 
accessed 13.02.18.  
7 For more detail on independent gas suppliers, see the website of the Associa-
tion of Independent Gas Transporters at http://www.aigt.org.uk/companies.asp, 
accessed 13.02.18.  
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lying the US system, i. e. the unbundling of a regulated carriage industry 
so that gas transmission services should be present in the market under 
close control from a regulatory authority. In some countries, gas trans-
mission systems are privately owned. The number of EU operators is ra-
ther considerable. In the EU gas industry, regulation applies to only 
transmission and distribution. Transmission companies must be certified 
in compliance with the unbundling requirements. Moreover, they also 
have to grant third parties non-discrimination access to their networks, 
based on a number of regulations (network codes) and according to the so-
called Third Energy Package (in particular, EU Directive 2009/73/EC). 
Overall, access to gas transmission and distribution is regulated using 
standard access conditions and tariff rates, whereas access to gas pipeline 
beyond the national network is granted within negotiated third-party 
access agreements with possible exceptions to ensure continuous ope-
rations. 
Thus, we can conclude that in international gas transmission prac-
tices, modes of governance reflect problems emerging in the conditions 
of long-term highly specific investment. In most countries, conditions of 
access to gas transmission systems are regulated. They are rarely establi-
shed on a bilateral basis — when specificity is relatively low, i. e. the 
number of both suppliers and consumers is significant. 
 
3.2. Selection of governance structures,  
subject to the requirements of the Third Energy Package.  
Russian gas transported via the Baltic 
 
A vivid recent example of a transformation in the mechanisms for gas 
industry coordination was the gas industry liberalisation in Europe. The 
key regulations were the constituents of the so-called Third Energy 
Package adopted in 2009 — the Directive 2009/73/EC and Regulation 
EC No. 715/2009. However, the reform was launched as early as the 
1990s, and was inspired by similar events in the US. These documents 
allow for alternative modes of governance in regard to the services of gas 
transportation between gas producers, on the one hand, and gas pipeline 
operators, on the other hand. The documents suggest three alternatives: 
ownership unbundling (OU), the status of an independent system 
operator (ISO), and that of an independent transmission operator (ITO) 
[22]. In the first case, two companies should have two different owners, 
which means virtual autonomy, whereas, in the second and third cases, 
transportation assets can remain in the ownership of gas companies. 
However, ISO suggests that capacities are managed by a special indepen-
dent organisation and ITO and that they can remain under the manage-
ment of a vertically integrated company provided its operational and 
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financial structures are separated and it keeps separate records of its 
revenue and expenditures. The latter two variants suggest strict control 
from the European Commission to ensure scrupulous and non-dis-
crimination management of gas pipelines. 
In terms of modes of governance, which were examined above in 
detail, it means that European legislators tried to replace the earlier 
hierarchical modes of governance between a gas company and a pipeline 
operator with the following options. The first one is a package of market 
mechanisms if part of the capacities is sold to independent participants at 
an auction, especially if a short-term contract is concluded. The second 
one includes bilateral mechanisms if long-term contracts are concluded 
with independent market participants based on auction results and similar 
process. The third variant is trilateral mechanisms if pipeline operators 
conclude contracts with pipeline owners under strict control form the 
European Commission within the ITO/ISO models. 
One of the most serious problems associated with the use of new 
modes of governance relating to gas transportation is the conflict around 
the Nord Stream pipeline and its onshore extensions. 
Nord Stream is an offshore pipeline that runs across the bottom of the 
Baltic Sea to connect Russia and Germany. It delivers 55 billion m3 of 
gas per year and includes 2 lines, each with a capacity of 27.5 m3. The 
pipeline is owned by a consortium of major stakeholders, including 
Gazprom (the controlling block of shares) and a number of European gas 
companies (Germany’s Wintershall and E. ON, the Netherlands’ Ga-
sunie, and France’s Engie). The pipeline’s construction was a response to 
the following circumstances. Firstly, there was a need to create sufficient 
gas transmission infrastructure for North-western and Central Europe in 
view of a possible increase in demand for imports and of the depreciation 
of existing pipelines. Secondly, it was necessary to diversify the routes of 
gas supply from Russia in view of the existing risks in relations with 
transit states. 
In recent years, the discussion has focused on the economic feasibility 
and, in a broader sense, the rationality of the decision made for the parties 
to a project and their states, as well as on the project’s impact on the gas 
market. Lately, the discussion has been brought to the fore by the 
anticipated construction of a peer pipeline — Nord Stream 2, which will 
follow a similar route. 
Most studies focusing on Nord Stream address a more complex 
object, namely the EU — Russia energy relations. The Nord Stream 
pipeline is usually considered as an element of a ‘big game’ of ensuring 
energy security of both parties against the background of high mutual 
dependence. A recent work [23] uses a game theory simulation to de-
monstrate that the Nord Stream pipeline is the most promising project 
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from the perspective of strategic investment. Moreover, it contributes to 
the negotiation power of German and Russia in Europe and reduces that 
of other participants. Other authors [24] have arrived at similar results 
using an analogous methodology. Although the above studies do not 
address the modes of governance relating to the Nord Stream pipeline, 
they attest to the high specificity of the project and related assets. The 
project is not only a means to transport gas in general but primarily a 
means to transport gas between the two specific parties to the transaction. 
Other findings [25] demonstrate the asymmetry in the impact of the 
Nord Stream pipeline on transit risks faced by different EU member 
states, which once again prove the high specificity of the asset. However, 
the presence of a regulator, which has to aggregate the positions of 
different European shareholders, attaches a new aspect to the problem of 
selecting a mode of governance. Probably, the regulator, which 
intervenes in transaction management as a third party, is not interested in 
efficient transactions and it may even jeopardise them. However, in this 
work, we will not address this particular aspect. Therefore, we will assu-
me that the regulator will not engage in opportunistic behaviour. Note 
that the latter term should not have a negative connotation. There are 
distinctly different approaches to energy security in Europe and, in 
particular, in the Baltic region (for more detail, see [26—29], thus, Euro-
pean regulators have to resort to, figuratively speaking, mixed strategies 
when designing energy security institutions and using enforcement tools. 
Another area of research focuses on the legal regulation of the 
construction and operations of gas pipeline system with offshore sections, 
i. e. the rights of the third parties to intervene in governance from a legal 
perspective. In particular, Langlet and Talus [30; 31] emphasise that, in 
the current international institutional environment, coastal states and the 
EU as a whole have very limited rights in regard to the Nord Stream 
pipeline. These rights relate to restrictions on pipeline construction but 
not on gas carriage transactions. This means that the project participants 
have to face a diverse institutional environment and, therefore, with non-
harmonised limitations on selecting modes of governance along the 
onshore and offshore sections of the same gas transportation system. 
Research literature rarely offers an immediate analysis of modes of 
governance relating to gas transportation along the Nord Stream pipeline 
and its extensions, from the perspective of the transaction cost econo-
mics. Nevertheless, some experts are exploring the issue. In particular, it 
has been stressed [32] that the Russian supplier’s interest in offshore gas 
transportation may be explained by the possible project participants from 
the Baltics rejecting the idea of hierarchical relations. If they were ready 
for this format, the pipeline would run across their territories. This is very 
much in line with our position on the priority of the hierarchical mecha-
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nisms for managing transaction relating to gas transportation services 
within the project in question. However, another work [32] uses a diffe-
rent hierarchy concept borrowed from the international relations theory. 
In 2011, when gas was pumped into the first line of the Nord Stream, 
Gazprom was faced with the problem of implementing a necessary 
mechanism for transaction management. We will dwell on it at some 
length. The company had to manage the onshore extension — two lines 
running from the German city of Greifswald — OPAL and NEL. The 
two pipelines were operated by the companies OPAL Gastransport and 
NEL Gastransport. Gazprom had control over both operators and over the 
gas pumped through the Nord Stream. 
The level of specificity is very high for OPAL, NEL, and the Nord 
Stream. The services of the OPAL and NEL have value only if gas supply 
from the Nord Stream is secured. At the same time, the services of the 
Nord Stream have value only if there is an opportunity to pump gas into 
OPAL and NEL. The high level of transaction frequency is undoubted. 
Gas supply must be uninterrupted and in line with the consumption rate 
to ensure heat and electricity generation. In this case, uncertainty is ac-
counted for by the number of necessary transport services, which is affec-
ted by competition, transit problems on other routes, and — most impor-
tantly — the level of economic activity, energy regulations, and weather 
conditions. The latter three parameters influence gas demand, which is 
highly volatile (figure 3). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Gas consumption and deviation from the average in 2000—2016 
Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2017 
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In view of these transaction attributes, the best possible mode of 
governance  is hierarchy. However, it does not meet the requirements of 
the Third Energy Package. The Gazprom Group submitted applications 
for excluding the operators OPAL and NEL from the EC’s standard gas 
regulation. There was such an opportunity for new pipelines. The NEL 
application was rejected straight away. Gazprom had to adopt the ITO 
model, thus abandoning the hierarchy mechanism. In this case, the 
company’s transaction costs are difficult to observe, whereas OPAL was 
affected by the problems of the new European regulation in a more evi-
dent manner. 
As to OPAL, the European Commission made an exemption decision 
and the hierarchy mechanism was preserved within the Gazprom Group — 
albeit for limited gas volumes. This was achieved by introducing a limit 
to the volume of gas that Gazprom could ship to OPAL’s exit point at 
Brandov at the German-Czech border. The company was not allowed to 
utilise more than 50 % of OPAL’s capacity. The rest of the capacity could 
not be used to transport Gazprom’s gas but it could be transferred to 
other gas companies. However, due to some technical issues, only Gaz-
prom could ship gas to OPAL. Therefore, the EC’s decision created a si-
tuation when OPAL had to work at only half the capacity over several 
years. This translated into a lower gas supply and rising gas prices in the 
Czech Republic. The outcome was opposite to what was intended. Gaz-
prom tried to sell part of the gas to other gas companies at the OPAL 
entry point. However, the demand was minimal [33]. 
At the end of 2016, the European Commission permitted OPAL 
Gastransport to sell the available capacity through an auction platform 
and Gazprom to buy it. As a result, OPAL approached full capacity.8 
Thus, quasi-market mechanisms were introduced anyway. Today, part of 
the capacity is distributed according to the regulator’s rules using the 
auction procedure. However, in recent years, costs were incurred by both 
producers and consumers, whereas positive effects of the previous poli-
cies remain unclear. If there is one producer and one consumer, which are 
affiliated, even a strict control over their relations or the prices they set 
for each other regulates neither what parties can take part in a transaction, 
not their incentives, nor their limitations, nor shipment volumes. 
At the same time, the use of the price mechanism, which determines 
the transaction attributes, requires an acknowledgement of the presence 
of a commodity market. In particular, this is necessary for utilising 
antitrust policy tools to prevent the abuse of a dominant positions or anti-
competitive agreements. 
In the above example, hybrid forms and hierarchies prevail as two 
classes of dedicated institutional arrangements ensuring uninterrupted 
                                                     
8 This decision did not come into effect immediately, since it had been contested 
within European procedures. 
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and constantly renewed transactions. The hybrid mechanism for transac-
tion management suggests that the parties conclude a long-term contract 
covering comprehensive services. The hierarchy mechanism suggests 
utilising a pipeline built at the expense of a company in the framework of 
the same company. In the first case, all other things equal, there are 
grounds to speak of elements of the price mechanism and the presence of 
a commodity market, unbundled in accordance with the antitrust regula-
tion. In the second case, there are no such grounds. 
Accordingly, for performing the same operations (for instance, gas 
carriage), which presuppose the use of the price mechanism translates 
into the emergence of a commodity market, not by default but only if a 
number of conditions are met. If the conditions, which are examined 
above, are not met, investors choose alternative mechanisms to manage 
transactions. The availability of such a choice — and the protection of the 
right to make it — constitutes a fundamental principle of entrepreneur-
ship. Entrepreneurship, in its turn, ensures the stability of the mecha-
nisms for economic development and public welfare growth. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Economic models that provide a rationale for interventions from 
antitrust authorities often take the existence of a market of a relevant 
commodity or service as its basic premise. However, this trivial premise 
is not always met, since the specifics of transactions can translate into the 
emergence of a different coordination mechanism within an industry, 
probably, not even an industry but a separate product or geographical 
segment. 
Using a trilateral or bilateral mode of governance in the case of a nau-
ral or bilateral monopoly leaves room for the operations of an antitrust 
authority, which nevertheless might be forced to revise its approaches to 
regulation. 
The intervention of an antitrust authority into the hierarchy mecha-
nism for transaction management, i. e. the operations of a vertically inte-
grated company, can be justified only if there are sufficient grounds to 
restructure the company, with public welfare in mind. 
At the same time, as the case analyses examined show, disputes about 
attempts to construct an artificial market mechanism can lead to a subop-
timal result, if they ignore the attributes of relevant transactions, prima-
rily, their asset specificity. 
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